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The dominion of means over ends.  





Abstract. The institutions which grant credit today can be 
considered to be an example of what Max Weber describes as the 
typical rationalization of modern age. Such a rationalization 
would bring a lack of reflection on what should be the ultimate 
significance of certain technical means, which are confused with a 
value-in-itself of a social context. The paper highlight the fact 
that the function of credit consistent with individuals’ ‘ultimate 
ends’ seems to be that of a temporal coordination between the 
‘bargaining wills’ of different individuals who aim at obtaining 
the highest benefit by means of the utility of their products and 
the products of their peers. But the current epoch has favored the 
elevation of historically determined features of credit-issuing to 
ultimate ends. Referring, among other sources, to a report by the 
Bank of England and to studies by Neo-Keynesian authors such as 
Stiglitz, this essay establishes that the consequence of the current 
private structure of credit-issuing is that the ultimate end of credit 
does not coincide with maximization and economic reciprocity but 
with the assessment of a risk which is distinctly private. Also, 
since in this structure Central Bank acts as the bank of all 
commercial banks, credit granting can be read as being in function 
of the availability – within a circumscribed economic web – of a 
specific credit ‘raw material’ which has a price: central bank’s 
liquidity. This situation puts a deep philosophical problem into 
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the limelight, since any ‘existential’ preferability of the current 
model of credit issuing can only be explained as an alienation. 
 





The objective of this paper is to define an ultimate end of the tool of financial 
credit, by means of which it will be possible to compare the functioning of the 
present financial institutions in order to verify whether such an end is fulfilled 
or encounters alterations and obstacles. 
 
The definition of such an ultimate end will be drawn from the only concept of 
credit consistent with the objective of maximization of every economic agent’s 
reciprocal usefulness in an exchange economy, once it is identified as the 
ultimate goal of exchange economy itself. 
 
The methodology used for this comparison will consist in: 
1 - the clear definition of the ultimate value-axioms from which the instrument 
of credit and, therefore, institutions of credit are derived; 
2 - the determination of the consequences which the realization of these value-
axioms bring about as they are bound to certain intrinsic features of these 
institutions. 
 
This empirical observation can lead, in fact, to the uncovering of new practical 
axioms which the inventors of a certain instrument or institute did not take into 
consideration and which conflict with the former ultimate axioms. These 
conflicting axioms are the result of the historical form which the financial 
system has taken. These historical forms crystallized certain practices which 
make institutions of credit operate by means of norms which are ‘normative’ in 
the sense that they just ensure the good functioning of the technical means they 
use. These may have their own consistent logic, but their suitability for the end 
of human happiness is often not investigated. 
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This kind of procedure is inspired by the writings of Max Weber in which he 
portrays modernity as the triumph of the bureaucratic systems. The paper starts 
with an account of this very concept in order to show its fundament in Weber’s 
thought and, then, deals with the relevant scientific literature in order to assess 
the structure of modern credit issuing. In the second part, the essay will stress 
the fact that the measures dominating the most important current attempts to 
make the financial system more efficient – such as the Basel accords and 
European Banking Union - are mere attempts to only quantitatively modify the 
effects of the axioms which in the current financial system conflict with the 
ultimate end of credit. 
 
 
The notion of bureaucracy and the role of scientific discussion 
on value preferences according to Max Weber 
 
In this section two dichotomies drawn from writings by Max Weber are 
presented. They concern the contradiction between the instrumental rationality 
a person uses to achieve some ends in a certain situation and the danger that a 
blind reliance on these same instruments may make such a person unaware that 
they are no longer suitable to achieve the consequences which are really desired. 
Weber’s proposal of gaining consciousness of one’s ‘real’ ends - which he usually 
describes as practical ‘value-axioms’ – and of how the tools judged as necessary to 
reach them prevent their very achievement is the methodological route which 
will be used with respect to the phenomenon of credit. 
 
The dichotomy between polytheism of values and the unquestioned dominion of 
a determined instrumental rationality 
One of the dichotomies present in Weber’s works is the one between the value 
fragmentation typical of modern European rationalization and the unconscious 
crystallization of ultimate values which is possible in the same process. 
Polytheism results from the fact that scientific and technical calculus refrain 
from establishing supernatural and absolute meanings. One needs ‘no longer 
have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did 
the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and 
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calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization 
means’ (Weber, 1919a, p. 144). This process is also called by Weber 
‘rationalization’, a term which refers to a particular use of ‘rationality’ whereby 
this latter limits itself to instrumental ends and does not engage in ultimate 
reflections about existential or religious evaluations. 
 
The ethical neutrality of technique ensures that no system of means can give us 
an a priori, natural existential meaning. The consequence is that ‘every single 
important activity and ultimately life as a whole, if it is not to be permitted to 
run on as an event in nature but is instead to be consciously guided, is a series of 
ultimate decisions through which the soul — as in Plato — chooses its own fate, 
i.e., the meaning of its activity and existence’ (Weber, 1949, p. 18). Polytheism of 
values inherent in modern rationalization, in other words, implies the necessity 
of an ‘authentic’ decision, a decision about the most important sense an 
institution or an instrument has for our will [1] ‘a decision which is all the more 
painful now that it needs to be enacted to choose between values whose 
disenchantment and relativity is recognized’ (Cacciari, 2006, p. xxxvii). 
 
The bureaucratization of administrations, institutions and governments is the 
social equivalent of the process of rationalization which has occurred in natural 
sciences and engineering. The purely bureaucratic type of administrative 
organization is: 
 
capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense 
formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over 
human beings […] The primary source of the superiority of bureaucratic 
administration lies in the role of technical knowledge which, through 
the development of modern technology and business methods in the 
production of goods, has become completely indispensable (Weber, 1922, 
p. 223). 
 
Within a bureaucratic arrangement of the social web one operates by means of 
practical values which are ‘normative’ first of all in the sense that they address 
the rightness and soundness of an instrumental rationality. The efficiency of a 
bureaucratic arrangement coincides with the achievement of the ends proper of a 
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technical process, independently of whether these are questioned or not in their 
consistency with the ultimate ends a subject would like to reach. 
 
All this can bring to existence a rationality which has been set up to ensure the 
perfect functioning of a device, of an instrument which has its own independent 
and consistent logic. The suitability of this instrument for the end of human 
happiness, though, needs to be established each time through a different type of 
rationality. A lack of attention to this difference, to this double level of 
rationality, makes a system which structurally conveys a polytheism of values to 
paradoxically put in place an arbitrary monotheism: the mere consideration of 
the instrumental value of a historically determinate set of devices. The danger 
intrinsic in this dynamics is that there can be a loss of awareness of the 
possibility that a set of devices is no longer coincident with the best instrument 
to achieve the existential values expressed by our will, expressed by one’s needs 
and by the needs of the other. A contingent instrumental rationality 
inadvertently ends up taking the place of the ultimate existential value. 
 
The awareness of this distortion of the role of means as ultimate ends brought by 
pervasive bureaucratization pushes Weber to his famous comments about the 
iron cage with which the modern organizations of production would coincide – a 
character from which not even socialism is immune (see De Feo, 1970). As he 
states in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: 
 
this order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of 
machine production which today determine the lives of all the 
individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly 
concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it 
will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt 
(Weber, 1930, p. 123). 
 
Weber even charges the ‘passion for bureaucratization’ with driving us to despair 
because of the fossilization and alienation [2] of one’s identity which its 
confusing means with ultimate ends provokes: ‘rational calculation […] reduces 
every worker to a cog in this [bureaucratic] machine and, seeing himself in this  
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light, he will merely ask how to transform himself from a little into a somewhat 
bigger cog’ (Roth, 1978, p. lix). His sharpest comment on how blind scientific 
calculation makes human beings lose sight of the proper and most suitable 
purpose of their life is made in Science as a Vocation: 
 
this process of disenchantment, which has continued to exist in 
Occidental culture for millennia, and, in general, this 'progress,' to 
which science belongs as a link and motive force, do they have any 
meanings that go beyond the purely practical and technical? […] [The 
civilized man] catches only the most minute part of what the life of the 
spirit brings forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always something 
provisional and not definitive, and therefore death for him is a 
meaningless occurrence (Weber, 1919b, pp. 21-22). 
 
The sensation of obtaining only ‘provisional’ satisfaction is for Weber the signal 
of an existence in which mere instrumental rationality prevails. 
 
The dichotomy between false neutrality and concealed value-judgment. Weber’s 
analytical proposal in order to go beyond it 
The second dichotomy which bureaucratization represents is the concealed – 
and, therefore, more deceitful and influent – value-judgment which is produced 
by the neutral, bureaucratic academic procedure of teaching scientific and 
sociological discipline by ‘letting the facts speak for themselves’. It is very 
difficult, in fact, to tell apart empirical statements of fact and value-judgments 
about the social suitability of the techniques described in these facts. This 
ensures that the description of ‘neutral’ technical calculations related to 
instruments or empirical facts transmits the sense of an absolute existential 
preferability of the success of such calculations: 
 
it is possible, under the semblance of eradicating all practical value-
judgments, to suggest such preferences with especial force by simply 
‘letting the facts speak for themselves.’ […]all such procedures on the 
university lecture platform, particularly from the standpoint of the 
demand for the separation of judgments of fact from judgments of value, 
are, of all abuses, the most abhorrent (Weber, 1949, pp. 9-10). 
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If one thinks how the historical progress the practical side of rationalization 
(technological, engineering, institutional progress) is determined by the 
political, intellectual side and vice versa, the close interdependence of the two 
dichotomies becomes evident. This explains Weber’s renowned concern about the 
role of politicians – especially when teachers and theorists are the one who 
inadvertently play this role. Technical-instrumental rational actions and 
explanations should not hide the fact that the choice between alternative and 
conflicting ultimate ends and results ‘may well be determined in a value-rational 
manner [that is, by means of ‘value-axioms’]’ (Weber, 1922, p. 26). They should 
not hide that this kind of rationality appears “irrational” in front of the 
instrumental kind of rationality and that ‘the orientation of action wholly to the 
rational achievement of ends without relation to fundamental values is, to be 
sure, essentially only a limiting case’ (Weber, 1922, p. 26). For this reason a type 
of ethics which refers to ultimate existential values and an ethics which focuses 
on the cause-effect mechanism of our actions are not opposite to one another but 
complementary: ‘an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility are not 
absolute contrasts but rather supplements which only in unison constitute a 
genuine man--a man who can have the “calling for politics’’’ (Weber, 1919b, p 
133).  
 
Weber is convinced that to put this interdependence between instrumental 
procedures and ‘irrational’ value-axioms which implicitly drive the purpose and 
the technical procedures themselves into this light is not only possible but 
necessary, and it is one of the methods and scopes of sociology. He states that a 
‘scientific’ discussion of value-judgments needs to realize the following points. 
a) ‘the elaboration and explication of the ultimate, internally 
“consistent” value-axioms, from which the divergent attitudes are 
derived’ (Weber, 1949, p. 20), because ‘people are often in error, not only 
about their opponent's evaluations, but also about their own’ (Weber, 
1949, p. 20). The validity of this procedure is not empirical but similar 
to logic. 
b) ‘the deduction of “implications” (for those accepting certain 
value-judgments) which follow from certain irreducible value-axioms, 
when the practical evaluation of factual situations is based on these 
axioms alone’ (Weber, 1949, p. 20). 
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c) ‘the determination of the factual consequences which the 
realization of a certain practical evaluation must have : (1) in 
consequence of being bound to certain indispensable means, (2) in 
consequence of the inevitability of certain, not directly desired 
repercussions’ (Weber, 1949, p. 21). This purely empirical observation 
can lead, in fact, to ‘the uncovering of new axioms (and the postulates to 
be drawn from them) which the proponent of a practical postulate did 
not take into consideration. Since he was unaware of those axioms, he 
did not formulate an attitude towards them although the execution of 
his own postulate conflicts with the others either (1) in principle or (2) 
as a result of the practical consequences’ (Weber, 1949, p. 21). 
 
This exact procedure will be now applied to the analysis of the phenomenon of 
financial credit, specifically as regards to the very creation and granting of 
credit within the structure of banking system. 
 
First, the ‘value-rational’ justification for the existence of credit and, therefore, 
the existential value-axiom which it recalls within society will be elucidated. 
Secondly, there will be a list of what are today considered as the indispensable 
means to bring these values to fruition and the ‘not directly desired 
repercussions’ which the utilizations of these means brings about. This will lead 
to the observation of at least two other axioms which are inherent to the 
‘necessary’ utilization of those means and which are incompatible with the first, 
main, value-axiom above all ‘as a result of their practical consequences’. These 
two axioms are emblematic of the byproducts of bureaucratization. In it, ‘what 
was originally a mere means (to an otherwise valuable end) becomes itself an 
end or an end in itself. In this way, means as ends make themselves independent 
and thus lose their original “meaning” or purpose, that is, they lose their 
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The ultimate value-axioms of credit according to its  
‘value-rational’ determination 
 
This analysis can begin by noticing that the only consistent justification for the 
existence of credit needs to account for the fact that it is, in fact, a particular 
case of the functioning of the economy of exchange, in whatever historical form 
one may intend it – capitalist economy, division of labor in a planned economy 
with ‘planned’ exchanges or social bonds created by gift exchange in a barter 
economy. In an economy made by autarchic individuals, in fact, nobody owes 
anything to anybody else, by definition. 
 
To establish a coherent ultimate end of the mechanism of credit, therefore, one 
has to set up an ultimate meaning of exchange economy which is consistent with 
the goal of the maximization of individuals’ will, in order to comply as much as 
possible with each person’s ‘value-rational’ decision. An exchange economy 
which, by means of its structures, aims at realizing everybody’s desires as much 
as possible can be conceived as a network of individuals who, by means of a 
maximized reciprocal bargaining power due to the usefulness they produce, aims 
at everybody’s highest possible well-being. It is interesting to note that this is 
also a conception of exchange economy which is consistent with Derrida’s and 
others’ ‘post-phenomenological’ definitions of ethics as ‘doing justice to the 
other’s naturalness’ (see for instance Derrida, 1990, Derrida, 1992 and Derrida, 
1995) once this definition recognizes the impossibility of escaping a do ut des 
structure within an inter-subjective environment. 
 
The kind of ‘ethics’ which emerges from this formal application of Weber’s 
categories needs a clarification with regards to its moral status: from a 
Weberian point of view, in fact, contrast between facts and values is resolved by 
differentiating one’s person ‘existential’ preferences (values) and the scientific 
analysis useful to understand the consistent way to reach them (which is value-
neutral, so it can be considered as a study of ‘facts’). The two notions cooperate as 
science helps to provide a basis to perform one’s ‘arbitrary’ ultimate ends, 
without explicitly supporting one of them in particular. This text uses this 
dynamic distinction in order to generalize in a formal way ‘what we, as 
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community based on an exchange economy, prefer’, namely to maximize our 
reciprocal usefulness in the economic exchanges. The paper, therefore, aims at 
analyzing what instruments such a community should use in order to achieve 
‘what it prefers in an exchange economy’, namely what is in general ‘preferable 
to be done’. The notion of credit and financial system emerge as necessary from 
the examination of such a ‘formal’ inter-subjective preference. 
 
Given this instrumental definition of an exchange economy as an 
‘instrumentally rational’ set of actions aimed at a decided ultimate value, credit 
emerges as an instrument necessary in this set because of the fact that it is 
typical within a market economy that not everybody immediately possesses all 
suitable instruments to set up a new activity or to update an old one in response 
to the contingent change in demand. In fact, credit makes sense only in presence 
of temporal or material asymmetries. 
 
Credit can be defined as a form of anticipated agreement which a community 
achieves with a future producer, an anticipation of the reward the producer is 
going to obtain which is necessary because of the physiological temporal 
discrepancy which exists between the capacity to produce and the recognition of 
a possible future agreement on reciprocal exchange. A physiological temporal 
discrepancy which is between the recognition of a future agreement on 
reciprocal exchanges and the producer’s possession of the material resources 
useful to support herself and to realize the product to exchange. Once credit is 
considered as a particular case of exchange economy, a case which occurs when 
temporal asymmetries have to be taken into account, this is the definition which 
is most consistent with the final goal of exchange economy itself [3]. 
 
Conceived in this way, the rational function of credit granting should be the 
investment of a society which recognizes the highest productive potentiality of 
any individual, puts it in relation with the potential necessities and desires of 
the community and provides the adequate monetary tools so that every economic 
agent is able to implement the corresponding production and transactions. In 
other words, credit should place the material and relational conditions for a 
maximized reciprocal economic usefulness and ‘bargaining power’. It should be 
implemented as an investment which an entire community makes in order to 
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maximize and equalize all individuals’ instrumental potentiality and reciprocal 
utility. 
 
It is necessary to list, now, what are today the institutionally established 
indispensable means to bring these goals to fulfillment. The following 
exposition, in fact, takes cognizance of the institutional structure in which 
credit creation is embedded and illustrates what follows from it as a ‘necessary’ 
structure for the issuance of credit and for the attempt to pursue the aim above. 
There is no need to ask for what– historical, material, ideological – reasons it is 
now the case that the underlying value of the optimization of reciprocal 
usefulness has to be fulfilled by means of certain established instruments. 
Following Weber’s sociological and philosophical approach, the purpose is 
firstly to discover contradictions between the value-axiom established for credit 
granting and other axioms inherent in the legal instrumental structure which 
performs it. Hence, it will be concluded that there is an inappropriate confusion 
between means and ultimate ends and that there is the necessity to rearrange 




The structure of today’s banking system 
 
One needs therefore to examine the functioning of the banking system in the 
parameters it uses in order to issue credit. This study will not touch the 
phenomenon of creation, buying and selling of financial instruments (such as 
bonds, shares, futures, etc.) which are purchased and exchanged with the 
exclusive aim of ‘betting’ on their future value or to modify their value or yield – 
causing a strongly inadequate credit allocation. The focus will be on the 
structure of the banking system and on the modalities of creation of credit by the 
system formed by a Central Bank and commercial banks, which is at the basis of 
the quoted phenomena. This will show that a transfiguration of what should be 
considered as contingent means of credit granting into ends in themselves is 
typical of the basic structure of credit creation from its very beginning. 
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The two main monetary tools in the mechanism of credit granting and in the 
consequent monetary exchange procedures are money from commercial banks 
and Central Bank money. In fact, 
 
Central Bank and commercial bank money coexist in a modern 
economy. Confidence in commercial bank money lies in the ability of 
commercial banks to convert their sight liabilities into the money of 
another commercial bank [when transactions from a bank’s client and 
another bank’s client occur] and/or into Central Bank money [when 
these transactions have to be settled by means of this kind of money, for 
instance] upon demand of their clients. In turn, confidence in Central 
Bank money rests in the ability of the Central Bank to maintain the 
value of the stock of currency as a whole (i.e. not only of the small 
portion it issues directly), or its inverse, to maintain price stability 
(Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2003, p. 1). 
 
The majority of interbank payments take place using Central Bank money as the 
settlement institution is generally a Central Bank [4]. 
 
In order to analyze this picture it is not wrong to describe it by saying that even 
if commercial banks can grant loans by electronically crediting the bank 
account of their customers with a certain deposit of commercial bank money 
expressly created without practical limits, they do need Central Bank money in 
order to settle every transfer a customer requires them to carry out (see McLeay, 
Radia and Thomas, 2014). [5] In particular, 
 
banks first decide how much to lend depending on the profitable lending 
opportunities available to them — which will, crucially, depend on the 
interest rate set by the Central Bank [a commercial bank having to 
estimate the cost of Central Bank liquidity against the interest that it 
expects to earn on the loans, given competition among banks]. It is these 
lending decisions that determine how many bank deposits are created by 
the banking system. The amount of bank deposits in turn influences 
how much Central Bank money banks want to hold in reserve (to meet 
withdrawals by the public, make payments to other banks, or meet 
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regulatory liquidity requirements), which is then, in normal times, 
supplied on demand by the central bank (McLeay, Radia and Thomas 
2014, p. 2). 
 
Central Bank money therefore has a price and this gives rise to several issues. 
Firstly, at a certain juncture, a bank may transfer to other banks a quantity of 
Central Bank money larger than the quantity it obtains from the rest of the 
banking circuit or by issuing shares (McLeay, Radia and Thomas, 2014, p. 2). 
Such a bank is therefore forced to borrow a further amount to make new loans, 
altering either the economic return on new lending or the interest rates it 
charges – which would reduce people’s desire to borrow. In fact 
 
whether through deposits or other liabilities, the bank would need to 
make sure it was attracting and retaining some kind of funds in order to 
keep expanding lending. And the cost of that needs to be measured 
against the interest the bank expects to earn on the loans it is making, 
which in turn depends on the level of Bank Rate [set by the Central 
Bank] (McLeay, Radia and Thomas, 2014, p. 5). 
 
Moreover, because of non-performing loans or financial investment losses, a 
commercial bank may lose Central Bank money, causing the same problems in 
the return on new lending as just described, also because it needs to retain 
liquidity to make up for losses and fulfill due payments soon to avoid additional 
interest charges. This institutional structure, typical of the great majority of 
today’s countries, is also empirically described by Wolyncewicz (2013) and 
Sheard (2013). 
 
Because of such a private risk commercial banks may become structurally risk-
averse, meaning that in order to safeguard their private business they may tend 
to avoid financing small entrepreneurs and innovations which are quite 
difficult to assess, despite the fact that they may give a great contribution to the 
technological and social advancement of a community (See, for instance, Stiglitz 
and Greenwald, 2003; see also James and Brophy, 1977). In addition, a similar 
attitude is emphasized in geographical areas in which there is little ‘pro-social  
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behavior’. Since anti-social behavior in economic relationships is often the 
result of interpersonal skepticism brought by long economic stagnation, this is 
likely to cause a vicious circle (see Andriani, 2014). This situation is also 
favored by the fact that banks often prefer to avoid lending rather than increase 
interest rates. In fact, as Stiglitz and Greenwald have shown, ‘raising the rate of 
interest may not increase the expected return to a loan; at higher interest rates 
one obtains a lower quality set of applicants (the adverse selection effect) and 
each applicant undertakes greater risks (the moral hazard, or adverse incentive, 
effect)’ (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003, p. 27). Stiglitz and Weiss also explain 
that such a risk aversion can take place even within a context of general 
financial equilibrium: 
 
in equilibrium a loan market may be characterized by credit rationing. 
Banks making loans are concerned about the interest rate they receive 
on the loan, and the riskiness of the loan. However, the interest rate a 
bank charges may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of loans by 
either: 1) sorting potential borrowers (the adverse selection effect); or 2) 
affecting the actions of borrowers (the incentive effect) […]It is difficult 
to identify ‘good borrowers’, and to do so requires the bank to use a 
variety of screening devices. The interest rate which an individual is 
willing to pay may act as one such screening device: those who are 
willing to pay high interest rates may, on average, be worse risks; they 
are willing to borrow at high interest rates because they perceive their 
probability of re-paying the loan to be low […] (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 
pp. 393-394). 
 
As a consequence of the described structure, it is necessary to observe how today’s 
credit granting has to be the result of the assessments of distinctly private, 
individual risk or return. It represent a different pragmatic scenario in respect 
to the collective risk-benefit ratio which should be taken as parameter for an 
‘investment which the entire society makes in order to maximize each 
individual’s instrumental potentiality and utility’. An individual lender who 
assesses her personal risk, in fact, can be indifferent about the possible technical 
and occupational advance which an investment on a start-up may bring to the 
entire society and very concerned about a possible personal loss of, say, sixty-
Domenico Cortese (2017), 'The dominion of means over ends. Modern bank credit and 
Max Weber’s  irrational rationalization', The Journal of Philosophical Economics: 
Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, X: 2, 65-101 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics X: 2 (2017)                                             79                                              
  
thousand euros. A publicly run institution can instead decide that a possible 
‘waste’ of that sum – whose risk is spread on millions of taxpayers or defused by 
using newly created ‘fiat money’ - is indifferent or negligible in comparison with 
the possible advantage of a successful investment. It may also consider that, 
rather than a waste, such an outflow would consist in an allocation of 
purchasing power toward non-productive individuals who, by spending that 
money, would not spoil society’s mood of confidence and good expectations so 
much. 
 
Such a structure also explains why credit institutions – and also companies – 
today show strong preference for short-term financial gains in comparison with 
long-term and more uncertain investments. This phenomenon is often called 
‘financialization’ and is likely to involve the formation of speculative schemes. 
Bagnai remarks how ‘in chapter XII of his General Theory, Keynes makes a 
very simple claim: markets are not interested in ‘making the best long term 
forecast for an investment’s probable return’ so to direct capitals to investments 
which are on average the most productive and which most generate growth and 
employment […] To behave in such a way would not be rational for them 
(Bagnai, 2012, p. 7). Using the words of Keynes: 
 
It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight 
to matters which are very uncertain. It is reasonable, therefore, to be 
guided to a considerable degree by the facts about which we feel 
somewhat confident [such as financial assets price change], even though 
they may be less decisively relevant to the issue than other facts about 
which our knowledge is vague and scanty (Keynes, 1936, p. 75). 
 
Throughout recent years this theme has been faced by many authors, for 
instance Lazonick (see Lazonick, 2010) who underlines the spread of the 
phenomenon of stock buybacks; Lapavitsas (see Lapavitsas, 2011), who identifies 
it with the change of the sources of capitalist profit, Keen (Keen, 2012), who 
demonstrates the consequences of this dynamics on the macroeconomic 
instability and Scott-Quinn (2012). Another interesting author who in the past 
decades anticipated the debate about the inability of financial institutions to 
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allocate capitals in a suitable way for a harmonic growth is Caffè (see for 
instance Amari, 2014). 
 
 
The consequences on the axioms determining today’s credit 
granting 
 
In the structure of credit granting outlined above, therefore, availability of 
credit is in function of a private assessment of the risk-benefit ratio. It can be 
illustrated as the consequence of the following two value-axioms. The first is the 
privilege, as credit issuers, of private actors with private commercial goals and 
necessities. The second is the necessity of Central Bank liquidity 
institutionalized as a kind of ‘credit raw material’ which has a price for those 
private actors. In fact, credit availability – and the assessment of private risk 
stated above - can be also read as dependent on each bank’s specific flow and 
supply of a socially invented credit raw material. It can vary according to 
previous bad or good decisions made by the bank – as well as according to 
specific central monetary policies whose correspondence to the ultimate value 
which has to determine credit availability should be examined. The logic 
inherent to these material conditions exacerbates the distance of the 
instrumental rationality currently driving the assignment of credit from the 
value-rational logic whose scope should be only to maximize and equalize 
reciprocal bargaining power. 
 
The contextual availability of Central Bank money - namely, the liquidity a 
bank can realistically draw by means of its inflows - coincides, mostly, with the 
availability of liquidity in depositors, shareholders or financial investors. 
Therefore, the value-axiom of the necessity of Central Bank liquidity, which has 
a price, can be considered as correspondent to that of the contextual availability 
of money as ‘reserve of value’ indicating the success of previous transactions or 
loans. After a contextual liquidity tightening, 
 
the credit spreads for the loans already granted might then be not high 
enough to cover expected losses and the default probability of a bank 
increases. If the bank intends to maintain the previous level of the 
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probability of default, either additional capital or a change in the asset 
structure is needed. As raising new capital is usually costly, the latter 
solution might be the only available one for the bank in the short run. 
In this respect the bank reaction stems only from the present balance 
sheet structure (being a result of previous decisions) (Chmielewski, 2006, 
p. 2). 
 
According to the pragmatic outcome of this set of instruments, the previous 
decisions of an institution of credit influence its willingness to change its ‘asset 
structure’ and, therefore, to take further risks, that is to say that they influence 
the result of the assessments of new borrowers. 
 
To be more precise, level of credit granting and assessment of private advantage 
by credit institutions end up being in function of the capacity to pay back 
exhibited by preceding borrowers. It is also in function of the assessment of the 
income situation of the community where a potential new borrower lives, made 
in order to calculate the level of effective capacity to demand held by her 
potential customers. It is clear that a similar established framework reduces a 
credit institution from being an instrument aimed at creating reciprocal 
attraction and bargaining power – which is implicit in the task of ‘maximizing’ 
it – to being a mere function of the currently expected or potential level of 
reciprocity. But a preferable mechanism for the conferment of credit should ‘put 
the material and relational conditions for building a maximized and equal 
reciprocal economic usefulness first’. Assuming, for instance, an extreme case of 
recession where all actors have little or zero income. The ‘value-rational’ and 
‘instrumentally-rational’ behavior of such a mechanism should be to encourage 
those who have immediately ready productive potentialities to put more products 
into the market by providing adequate credit to their potential customers. These 
latter, obviously, need to be initially selected among the economic agents whose 
products also have immediate or short-medium time of production and 
immediate demand. This is in order to create reciprocal trust, to allow them to 
pay back their loans relatively soon without acting as ‘parasites’ in their 
bargaining and purchasing power and so as not to cause exaggerated inflation. 
As soon as the productive network and the reciprocal confidence become large  
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and strong enough, credit can be extended to entrepreneurs or professionals who 
have a longer time of research and investment or whose product demand is less 
basic and immediate. 
 
In order to implement similar measures a system of credit has to utilize a 
holistic logic according to which the contemporary concession of different loans 
and the parallel confidence in increase of economic demand can be calculated as 
likely to form a social result which will be greater than the sum of its single 
‘components’. This is different from the abstract and individualistic logic  
necessarily used by a private bank, in which diffidence about the possibility that 
other lending institutions put into action loaning decisions which increase 
aggregate demand needs to prevail – creating a self-fulfilling uncertainty. Also, 
a similar holistic rationality needs a credit system which does not excessively 
care about the risk that a certain loan may be paid back very late – or, in the 
extreme case, never. Credit institutions currently managing credit supply, as has 
been showed, need to safeguard their economic advantage and tend to be risk-
averse. 
 
The idea of a system of banks which has an essentially different role in 
comparison with ordinary firms is therefore crucial. It is related to all the 
macroeconomic theories akin to the so called Theory of Monetary Circuit (see 
for instance Graziani, 1990). These theorists usually reject the General 
Equilibrium Theory, which they see as a theory interpreting market economy as 
a simply barter economy with money added ex post with banks just acting as 
mediators – and not as creator of endogenous money (Graziani, 1990, p. 8; see 
also Howells, 1995). 
 
All these elements appear to lead to a preference for a public banking system 
and for a system of public investments and incentives. In order to maintain an 
harmonic growth and balanced focus, these systems should also be divided into 
different sectors according to the different industrial and economic sectors of a 
country. This would be justified by the fact that the anti-cyclical policies which 
a public instrument has been historically able to implement – opposite to the 
‘pro-cyclical’ ones illustrated in this paper as proper of the private credit system - 
are more consistent with the end of maximizing everybody’s reciprocal 
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potentialities, above all in the case of recessions. Such a preference is also 
founded on the capacities – in which a public credit system is specialized – to 
invest in projects which have the potentialities to produce good social 
externalities but which would not be convenient for an individual investor. This 
system is very similar to the banking system typical of Italy and France in the 
forty years following the Second World War, the period in which these two 
countries experienced an economic growth which outdid all the other major 
European countries.[6] Also, it would be useful to integrate these measures with 
a change in the system of assessment of the major banks, in order to prefer a 
more relationship-based and qualitative evaluation to a mere ‘quantitative’ one, 
based only on the past results of an entrepreneur (Bolton et al., 2013).  
 
Private risk assessment and concern due to the scarcity and the price of raw 
material as dependence on contextual availability of income are logics which are 
very different from the one credit granting should respect. They represent 
operational value-axioms, that is to say self-evident or universally recognized 
practical values which are, according to Weber’s methodological schema, 
inconsistent with ultimate credit value-axiom in their practical consequences. It 
is not the task of this paper to inspect the historical reasons why elements such 
as the private economic interest of the material mediator of the process of credit 
granting and the establishment of a potentially contextual scarce type of raw 
material of credit – scarce because costly – have arisen as absolute values of the 
mechanism of banking credit. What is remarkable for the present text is that in 
the light of what has been evaluated as the suitable ultimate end of credit in 
order to optimize everybody’s will, such elements appear at most as relative 
means, namely means which need to be assessed in their capacity to be consistent 
with the main objective. If they persist despite the fact that their pragmatic 
consequences are at odds with this objective it may mean that their utilization is 
existentially unquestioned. It may mean that they are the result of a 
‘bureaucratic’ alienation of human self-awareness whereby historically 
contingent tools are elevated to final ends. In this context, economic agents with 
particular interests – or ‘alienated’ ones – can find the practical effects of the 
bureaucratic machine perfectly suitable to such an extent that they are able to 
exploit the economic and cultural dominance acquired from it in order to 
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ideologically maintain a device even should it becomes socially unsustainable. 
As Weber also notices: 
 
the existing bureaucratic apparatus is driven to continue functioning by 
the most powerful interests which are material and objective, but also 
ideal in character. Without it, a society like our own — with its 
separation of officials, employees, and workers from ownership of the 
means of administration, and its dependence on discipline and on 
technical trainings — could no longer function (Weber, 1922, p. 224). 
 
The ‘ideality’ of these interests can be located in elements such as, for instance, 
the abstractness and blindness of the particular interest of the private 
‘entrepreneurs’ who are credit issuers, an interest which is legitimate and 
‘rational’ within the present instrumental dynamics. The instrumental position 
which these actors occupy in this dynamics makes them usually able to have 




Recent measures of emergence and reforms of the  
financial system 
 
The next step of this examination is indeed to stress the fact that the measures 
dominating the most important current attempts to make the financial system 
more efficient are mere attempts to merely quantitatively modify the effects of 
the value-axioms quoted above, even if there is no reason to think that their 
general structure may change the basic characteristics of their effects. In 
particular, these measures correspond simply to attempts to diminish individual 
risk and losses by commercial banks and creditors in their assessments of a 
borrower, together with attempts to increase the quantity of credit raw material 
in circulation. They also may consist in channeling off the scarcity of credit raw 
material, which can structurally arise, towards agents and environments which 
would be ‘less contagious’ in the spread of risk-aversion and bad expectations 
which is possible within the described scenario. 
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According to the methodological analysis performed in the previous sections, all 
this means that the two axioms inherent to the tools used in credit institutions 
today are not put into question. They are definitely maintained and, 
consequently, their effects of diverting the nature of credit granting from 
fostering a maximization of reciprocal usefulness toward being a function of 
some private individuals’ risk assessment and inflow of Central Bank liquidity 
are not removed. These effects are only softened. As a consequence, it is 
consistent with Weber’s analysis to assert that, despite the reformative attempts, 
which are going to be explained later, the conflict between the value-axiom 
which manifests economic agents’ maximization of well-being and the axioms 
resulting from the current system of credit granting persists. The most important 
ones of the recent reforms of the system are listed hereafter and the reason why 
the conflicting axioms are only slightly altered in their effects is illustrated. 
 
The Basel accords and the steps envisaged by the European Banking Union 
Let us start with considering the so-called Basel accords. The second institution 
of these accords was initially published in 2004, repeatedly amended in the 
following years and implemented, by most major economies, by 2008 (see Yetis, 
2008). The third institution of these agreements was established by the members 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the so called ‘group of ten’ 
countries) in 2010–2011. (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010a). 
Both of them impose the maintenance of a certain regulatory capital within the 
institutions of credit. This is estimated through the calculation of credit risk, 
operational risk and market risk which a bank takes on and it is implemented 
together with adequate supervision and transparency mechanisms in relation to 
the regulation.  
 
According to the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards, in the Basel II accord ‘capital ratio is calculated using the definition 
of regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets. The Tier 1 total capital ratio must 
be no lower than 8%. Tier 2 capital is limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital’. (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 12). In this formula, the term ‘Tier 
1’ refers to the safest part of capital, that is to say primarily to common stock 
and disclosed reserves (or retained earnings). The term ‘Tier 2’ refers to less safe 
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 capital, which is composed of items such as revaluation reserves, undisclosed 
reserves, hybrid instruments and subordinated term debt. The Basel committee 
on banking supervision, committed to the Basel III improvements of the 
preceding regulations, also claims that 
 
it is critical that banks’ risk exposures are backed by a high quality 
capital base. The crisis demonstrated that credit losses and write-downs 
come out of retained earnings, which is part of banks’ tangible common 
equity base. It also revealed the inconsistency in the definition of capital 
across jurisdictions and the lack of disclosure that would have enabled 
the market to fully assess and compare the quality of capital between 
institutions. To this end, the predominant form of Tier 1 capital must be 
common shares and retained earnings. This standard is reinforced 
through a set of principles that also can be tailored to the context of 
non-joint stock companies to ensure they hold comparable levels of high 
quality Tier 1 capital (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010b, 
p. 2). 
 
The scope of these regulations, therefore, is to ensure that the higher a bank’s 
exposure to credit and market risks is, the larger should be the quantity of safe 
capital retained in order to safeguard its financial solvency and stability. The 
distress caused by a possible lack of availability of Central Bank money – or of 
assets easily convertible into it – should be reduced, according to this logic, 
thanks to the relative financial protection of the economic agents who bring 
liquidity to the commercial bank. The fact that a bank is forced to have a more 
sensitive capital allocation and to maintain a buffer tier of capital in case of 
losses should make private investors – the kind of actors a private institution of 
credit mainly involves in its operations – more willing to invest and less likely 
to produce a contagion of lower financial expectations. In fact, 
 
the fundamental objective of the Committee’s work to revise the 1988 
Accord [the so called ‘Basel I’] has been to develop a framework that 
would further strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system while maintaining sufficient consistency 
that capital adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of 
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competitive inequality among internationally active banks. The 
Committee believes that the revised Framework will promote the 
adoption of stronger risk management practices by the banking 
industry, and views this as one of its major benefits (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 14). 
 
The mere quantitative modification of the consequences of the operational 
value-axioms of private risk assessment and concern due to the scarcity and the 
cost of raw material is clear in the fact that Basel accords just attempt to 
diminish possible losses and individual risk perceived by commercial banks and 
creditors in their assessments of borrowers. These institutions confirm, within 
the mechanism of credit granting, the logic of a private enterprise which may 
contribute to cause disequilibria due to losses and spread of lower expectations. 
Moreover, these measures – since they do not put into question the overall 
structure – cannot help but use the same, preceding logic in order to make risk 
lower. That is to say, they can only entail a sacrifice of funds which would 
otherwise be available for lending usage and are, instead, kept in banks’ vaults 
or used for very low risk activities. Lending capacity is above all limited by the 
bank’s very possibility of retaining adequate capital. To summarize, with the 
model of the Basel accords the scarcity of credit granting due to risk protection 
is only brought forward in time. The basis of this is the supposition whereby a 
greater protection of the economic agents who invest liquidity in the bank is 
preferable in order to minimize the risk of a general contagion of negative 
expectations, even at the cost of denying more credit to other economic agents. In 
effect, capital requirements 
 
is a limiting factor with regard to lenders’ transactions. Without raising 
further equity or securitisation, growth potential in lending is limited. 
In particular, because of the current limitations on their ability to pass 
on default risks by means of securitisations or other instruments on the 
capital market banks do not have further scope for lending [the 
Committee has established an amount of regulatory capital banks must 
hold for exposures to securitisations [7]. On top of this comes the newly 
introduced leverage ratio, mentioned above, which generally limits new 
business (Angelkort and Stuwel, 2011, p. 15). 
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The negative impact of Basel III regulations on small business financing had 
been easily predicted ever since the year of their introduction: 
 
the new regulations […] will disproportionately impact SMEs and 
startup companies. Small businesses and individuals will be ascribed a 
retail risk rating of 75%, provided the bank’s retail portfolio is diverse 
and no loan exceeds one million Euros’ (Padgett, 2013, p. 184). 
 
The increase of the cost of borrowing is another issue connected with these 
regulations, as has been raised by several critics (see Hall, 2002). This is due to 
the logistical cost of the banks’ adaptations to the new rules. As the general 
arrangement of the quoted agreements, this problem reflects the preference for 
the ‘absolute’ operative value of the protection of individual creditors from risk. 
The financial cost of the adaptation to the rules can be considered as an effect of 
the use of ‘secondary’ instruments which are necessary in order to fulfill the 
above practical value-axioms. In this scenario, the necessity of the gain of a 
private ‘mediator’ is absolutized, independently of whether this orientation is 
preferable in order to maximize everybody’s economic good expectation. 
 
It is important, now, to quote the content of the so called European Banking 
Union, the set of rules recently developed by the European Commission in order 
to ‘better regulate, supervise, and govern the financial sector so that in future 
taxpayers will not foot the bill when banks make mistakes’. (European 
Commission, 2015). It is necessary to notice, in the first place, how the 
prudential requirements proposed by the Commission explicitly correspond to 
the application of Basel III: 
 
the package on capital requirements for banks, the so called ‘CRD IV 
package (consisting of the Capital Requirements Directive IV) and the 
Capital Requirements Regulation)’ implements the new global standards 
on bank capital (commonly known as the Basel III framework) into the 
EU legal framework. The new rules in force since 1 January 2014, 
ensure banks now hold sufficient level of capital, both in quantity and 
in quality. With these rules, the EU has met its commitment to the G20 
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to implement the Basel III framework in a timely manner (European 
Commission, 2015). 
 
The initiative includes, therefore, a single set of rules for the European single 
market, as well as a single supervision mechanism for the implementation of 
these rules: 
 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism gives the European Central Bank 
(ECB) responsibility for supervision over banks in the euro area (and 
other SSM participating Member States). The ECB will ensure a truly 
European supervision mechanism that is not prone to the protection of 
national interests, will weaken the link between banks and national 
finances and will take into account risks to financial stability 
(European Commission, 2015). 
 
The two major steps envisaged by the European Commission to deal with failing 
institutions of credit – the so called bail-in and bail-out - are equally 
problematic since they represent another version of the application of the 
recalled value-axioms, only they are adapted to different empirical 
circumstances and evaluations. The Commission, in a statement dated 2014, 
claims that 
 
if, despite […] preventive measures, the financial situation of a bank 
would deteriorate beyond repair, the new law would ensure through a 
‘bail-in’ mechanism that shareholders and creditors of the banks would 
have to pay their share of the costs. If additional resources were needed, 
these would be taken from the national, prefunded resolution fund that 
each Member State would have to establish and build up so it reached a 
level of 1% of covered deposits within 10 years. All banks would have to 
pay in to these funds but contributions would be higher for banks which 
took more risks (European Commission, 2014, see also European 
Commission, 2016). 
 
Like the previous measures, to prevent a bank failing by putting the burden on 
investors and shareholders coincides with diverting the shortcomings originated 
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from a contextual lack of Central Bank’s money availability towards what are 
evaluated as ‘less contagious’ economic agents. As opposed to the general 
arrangement of Basel accords, in this case these agents are considered to be 
figures such as small depositors and potential borrowers. 
 
With regard to the bail-out, the public financial support of a failing institution 
of credit, after being vastly used around the world at the beginning of the 
current economic recession, it appears now to be considered the instrument of 
last resort by the proponents of the European Banking Union: 
 
indeed, the paradigm change from bail-out to bail-in has to become a 
reality for the Banking Union to become a success. We have to 
remember that a key issue to enter into the Banking Union was the 
vicious circle between banks and the debt of their sovereigns. As the 
financial crisis evolved and turned into the sovereign debt crisis in 
2010/2011, it became clear that, for those countries which shared a 
currency and were even more interdependent, more had to be done, in 
particular to break this vicious circle between bank debt and their 
national public finances (European Commission, 2016, pp. 5-6). 
 
From these lines it can be ascertained that the reason for setting aside the bail-
out as a primary instrument to deal with banks crises is that it simply failed to 
be the best empirical way to fulfill the same goal as described above. It proved 
itself not to be a good calculus to divert the shortcomings originated from a 
contextual lack of Central Bank’s money availability towards what are evaluated 
as ‘less contagious’ economic agents; these agents had been considered, in this 
case, mostly bank depositors, bank debtors and potential bank borrowers 
coincident with a country’s tax payers. The danger of the so called ‘moral hazard’ 
by the banks which benefit from the bail-out [8]   can be read as a direct effect 
of maintaining the pragmatic axiom-value of using private actors who have 
recourse to private commercial risk-benefit calculations as credit issuers, while 
the risk of losing Central bank money has been palmed off on the public sector. 
Even in this case the perspective of a possible private gain combined with the 
total absence of risk makes the private assessment of the convenience of granting 
credit definitely different from a public assessment in which the only parameter 
Domenico Cortese (2017), 'The dominion of means over ends. Modern bank credit and 
Max Weber’s  irrational rationalization', The Journal of Philosophical Economics: 
Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, X: 2, 65-101 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics X: 2 (2017)                                             91                                              
  
to take into account is the collective, political reaction of voters and tax payers to 
the social usefulness of the issuer’s decision. 
 
Negative interest rates on Central Bank’s deposits, cut in Central Bank interest 
rates and the Quantitative Easing 
A last measure whose rationale can be understood as ‘channeling off the scarcity 
of credit raw material, which can structurally arise, towards agents and 
environments which would be “less contagious” in the spread of risk-aversion 
and bad expectations’ can be considered to be the application of negative interest 
rates on Central Bank deposits. The ECB, for instance, ‘moved its deposit rate 
into negative territory in mid-2014 to “underpin the firm anchoring of medium 
to long-term inflation expectations’”. (Bech and Malkhozov, 2016, p. 32) This 
means that commercial banks effectively pay for depositing money with the 
Central Bank overnight, which makes it more convenient for them to try to 
invest their liquidity in ‘more risky’ activities. 
 
A cut in Central Bank interest rates (see European Central Bank, 2017) instead, 
can be interpreted as an ambiguous trade-off between diminishing the cost and 
the risk of some private creditors-investors (commercial banks, whose borrowers 
therefore find it cheaper to take out a loan) and diminishing the convenience of 
other creditors-investors (savers). The extent to which the effects of this trade-
off correspond to a neat improvement of the system’s efficiency cannot be defined 
here, even if it is considered as a way to increase the presence of ‘credit raw 
material’ in the hands of agents and within environments which would be more 
contagious ‘in the spread of risk-aversion and bad expectations’: 
 
the ECB’s accommodative monetary policy stance has substantially 
lowered borrowing costs for firms and households, while also lowering 
the returns on savings. As households do not only borrow, but also save, 
this raises the question about the extent to which lower interest rates 
have affected households’ net interest income. This is particularly 
relevant when assessing the impact of lower interest rates on aggregate 
consumption (European Central Bank, 2016). 
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It is clear, in any case, that even these measures are a way to quantitatively 
modify the effects of the value-axioms quoted above without having any reason 
to think that their general structure may change the basic characteristics of 
their effects – it is evident, above all, in a context of recession when a credit 
crunch can definitely persist despite a lowering of interest rates. 
 
A mere quantitative modification of the limits indicated in this text also 
characterizes the institution of the monetary measure named ‘quantitative 
easing’. By means of the same, a Central Bank buys a certain quantity of assets – 
generally government bonds – from a commercial bank, using newly created 
liquidity: 
 
QE involves a shift in the focus of monetary policy to the quantity of 
money: the central bank purchases a quantity of assets, financed by the 
creation of broad money and a corresponding increase in the amount of 
central bank reserves. The sellers of the assets will be left holding the 
newly created deposits in place of government bonds. They will be likely 
to be holding more money than they would like, relative to other assets 
that they wish to hold. They will therefore want to rebalance their 
portfolios, for example by using the new deposits to buy higher-yielding 
assets such as bonds and shares issued by companies (McLeay, Radia 
and Thomas, 2014, p. 11). 
 
In this way, therefore, the commercial bank owns new ‘credit raw material’ in its 
deposits at the Central Bank which does not produce further value until it is 
utilized. The change brought by quantitative easing, in effect, is limited to an 
increase in the quantity of liquidity in circulation within a certain economic 
circuit. Neither the logic of risk-aversion in regards to projects which would be 
useful to the collective economy, nor a logic which prefers short-term large 
individual gains (as in financing real estate bubbles) rather than long-term 
possible earnings from investments in socially useful innovations are prevented 
from being favored by quantitative easing. What its mechanism can allow 
according to the structure analyzed before is, at best, to relatively reduce risk-
aversion. This occurrence, furthermore, does not seem to be sufficient to contrast 
a credit crunch in a context of global recession or stagnation, as has been 
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empirically confirmed since QE implementation. As a report about the financial 
impact of this measure in the Us says, for instance, 
 
with contracted demand, uncertain future and increased regulation 
(especially with requirements to raise capital adequacy ratios), 
community banks didn’t play the countercyclical role Bernanke would 
have hoped for. In the three years following the Lehman collapse, credit 
conditions tightened and loan supply fell—in fact, some studies find 
that the loan supply shock contributed to 50% of the GDP growth 
contraction in 2008/9 in the U.S. Could the Fed have done more in that 
respect? That is what Professor Joseph Stiglitz argued during our 
interview, stressing that there was ‘no way QE could work without 





To sum up what appears from the outline of the main corrective actions applied 
to the credit system in recent years, they limit themselves to propelling the 
validity of the two value-axioms pinpointed above, which are inconsistent with 
credit ultimate value-axioms in their practical consequences. These actions 
quantitatively modifying (but do not put into question) the effects of the 
instruments through which these axioms are put into practice and with whose 
characters they coincide. The first of these practical value-axioms is the 
necessity whereby the figure who evaluates the suitability of credit issuing must 
be recruited from among private actors with private commercial goals and 
necessities. The second is the necessity of Central Bank liquidity 
institutionalized as a kind of ‘credit raw material’ which has a price and, as a 
consequence, the conception of credit as a goods whose scarcity or abundance 
should depend on the current availability of liquidity in the hand of the 
economic agents of a certain context. These two principles are inherent in the 
material structure of the banking system and reflect a myopic and partial logic 
in comparison with what would be its ‘rational’ aim. This would be the 
investment of a society which recognizes the highest productive potentiality of 
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any individual, puts it in relation with the potential necessities and desires of 
the community and provides the adequate monetary tools so that every economic 
agent is able to implement the corresponding production and transactions. This 
situation puts a deep philosophical and existential problem into the limelight, 
since any existential preferability of the current model of credit issuing can only 
be explained as an alienation which, to use Weber’s terminology, represents ‘the 
dominion of means over ends – being the end the fulfillment of necessities’. 
(Cohen, 1991, p. 95). The social legitimacy of current value-axioms of credit 
granting can only reside in them being longstanding manifestations of historical 
and accidental characteristics of the tool of credit: they can find their raison 





[1]  In this paper, for ‘will’ is intended what is usually meant by desire in 
economics, or even intentions, goals. One of the differences between the 
traditional meaning used in the discipline and the concept as developed in this 
essay is that one individual’s ‘economic’ willingness is a subset of the overall 
identity of a subject and cannot be split from such an existential account. 
 
[2] Alienation can be interpreted as the fact whereby pragmatic values which 
would be useful to enhance one’s identity and satisfaction are obscured by a 
mechanical application of conventional or instrumental ends. 
 
[3] Such a definition of credit and debt as structural in social relationships and 
expectations and not necessarily ‘violent’ phenomenon is quite different, for 
instance, from Graeber’s anthropological account of debt (Graeber, 2011), in 
which he manifests the preference for an epoch of human history where, 
supposedly, the instrument of I-owe-you was less deleterious in its exploitation 
and domination effects for the fact that it was less a ‘debt’ and more a relational 
expectation, due to how little human beings saw themselves as mere ‘market 
instruments’. 
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[4]  This kind of money can be considered as the ‘final’ means of settlement even 
if one takes into account that its use is limited to so called ‘top-tier’ banks, those 
banks holding accounts with the settlement institution which ‘are generally 
banks which in turn provide accounts and payment services [which can be 
performed in commercial banks money] to their own customers, which may be 
other banks, non-bank financial institutions, non-financial firms or 
individuals’ (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2003, p. 10). 
 
[5] On the ‘endogenous’ nature of money creation in practice see, also, Moore 
(1988), Howells (1995), Palley (1996) and Tobin (1963). On the general topic of 
the difficulty for banks to raise funds see also Stein (1998). 
 
[6] See J. Sapir (http://russeurope.hypotheses.org/1500). The necessity of State 
directed funds and credit in the picture of a powerful industrial policy is 
emblematically illustrated by the French economist Sapir (2013) and by 
Mazzucato (2014). The requirements just described have been re-proposed by 
Stiglitz and Greenwald (2012). The difference between a banking system which 
focuses on and long-term policies which favor public well-being and a system 
focused on individuals’ separated necessities which act in a pro-cyclical manner 
is well described by Costi (2012). 
 
[7] See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014). ‘Securitisation’ can be 
defined as the practice of combining various types of contractual debt such as 
residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, auto loans or credit card debt 
obligations and selling their related cash flows to third party investors as a 
financial asset. 
 
[8] The excessive risk taking resulting from widespread support to the financial 
system, see Allen et al. (2015). 
 
[9] Cashman et al. (2016). Notice that in my work I did not mention other recent 
important measures which can be considered redundant for the philosophical 
goal of the study, since they can be easily re-conducted to some of the logic 
reflected in the ones recalled (above all expansionary policies such as LTRO), 
see for instance Duprat (2013). 
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